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Nontechnical Summary
Tax competition may bean o spring of the combat against unemployment: Governments typically want to help their economies prosper, and with unemployment galore many believe that actively attracting investment by providing subsidies or preferential tax treatment is a good means to this end. When they luckily lured an investor to their region, politicians can proudly point t o the jobs they successfully "created" and which, in their interpretation, would have been lost to other regions had they not fought so bravely in a tax competition game or a bidding war. However, largesse to mobile investors requires a deep hand in somebody's pockets. In the absence of intergovernmental funds sharing, all infrastructure expenditures, subsidies, tax breaks, etc. have to be nanced out of the budget of the government that grants them { hence out of revenues from other tax bases.
The tax bases supposed to foot the bill for attractive p a c kages to mobile investors can themselves be mobile or immobile { which makes up for crucial di erences in the strategic incentives of governments in a scal game. E.g., assume that governments have to nance their expenditures by a tax on labour income. If labour is immobile, then it makes a rather inelastic tax base that governments can easily resort to. This is the case most often discussed in the tax competition literature. If, however, the labour tax base is itself mobile between regions and workers will choose their residence as to avoid high taxes, governments face a t r i c kier task: To attract investors they have t o p r o vide subsidies at a su ciently generous level. The costs have t o becovered from taxes on mobile workers who will only want to settle in a region where taxation is su ciently low. This forces governments in the splits: They are required to nance generous expenditures out of low taxes.
To get a job, workers must settle where rms are located, i.e. where subsidies are high. High subsidies necessitate, however, high taxes to belevied on workers. Workers thus are nancing their own jobs { by the intermediation of governments. Governments act as middlemen in the labour market: They "buy jobs" when rewarding rms which locate in their region with a subsidy, and they "re-sell the jobs" when charging income taxes to workers which serve to cover the governments' budgetary needs. Since only employed workers pay taxes and the numberof employed workers in a region is limited by the number of jobs created there, rationing may possibly occur in the labour market. This prevents that doing the splits may end too painful for governments.
Introduction
Tax competition may be the o -spring of governments' ght against high unemployment. Governments typically want to help their economies prosper, and with unemployment galore many believe that actively attracting investment b y providing subsidies or preferential tax treatment is a good means to this end. If in an integrated economy t h e y l u c kily lured an investor to their jurisdiction, politicians can proudly point to the jobs they successfully "created" and which, in their interpretation, would have been lost to other regions had they not fought so bravely against their competitors from other jurisdictions. The strive to attract businesses not too seldom takes the form of tax competition games and veritable bidding wars. 1 Fiscal games of this type are played among national governments as well as, on the subnational level, between regional or local ones. In any case, o ering fat bribes is not without cost, and largesse to mobile investors usually requires a deep hand in some taxpayers' pockets. Ignoring the intricacies of tax incidence, any t a x cut for companies and any tax-nanced subsidization of rms e ectively involves a redistribution from some other taxpayers to capital owners, for whom the subsidies or special tax treatments represent pure gains. In the absence of intergovernmental funds sharing, all infrastructure expenditures, subsidies, tax breaks, tax rebates etc. have to be nanced out of the budget of the government that grants them { and hence out of its own revenues from other tax bases.
The tax bases supposed to foot the bill for attractive tax and subsidy packages for mobile investors can themselves be mobile or immobile { which makes up for a crucial di erence in the strategic incentives for governments when entering into a scal game. Assume, e.g., that there is only one such tax base available, say labour income:
If, as it is commonly assumed in tax competition models, workers are immobile between jurisdictions, their incomes o er a rather inelastic tax base which g o vernments can resort to when competing for investment. As a result, one nds both a high tax burden on immobile tax bases and a high subsidization of (or a low tax burden on) mobile tax issues (see, among many others, Bucovetsky/Wilson 1991) . The shift of the tax burden from internationally mobile capital to more immobile labour and consumption which can be observed in all industrialized countries over the last 15 years is sometimes regarded as anecdotal evidence of this result.
If, however, workers are also mobile between jurisdictions and choose their residence such as to avoid high tax burdens, governments face a trickier task: To attract investors they 1 Notable examples are listed in Black/Hoyt (1989) , Haaparanta (1996) , and in The Economist (issue of Fe b . 1 , 1 9 9 7 , p . 2 5 ) . For a comprehensive discussion of the role of subsidies to private rms in federal systems see Mueller (1997) . 1 have to provide su ciently generous subsidies or preferential tax treatment the costs of which h a ve t o b e c o vered from taxes on mobile households. Taxpayers, however, will only want to live in a jurisdiction when (i) there are enough jobs (say, when subsidies are high enough to make rms settle there), and when (ii) tax rates are su ciently low. Obviously, this forces governments "in the splits": They are required to nance generous expenditures out of low taxes.
In this paper we present such a model of tax competition among governments "in the splits": Governments lure mobile investors by high subsidies and mobile households by job opportunities and low income taxes. We use "subsidy" as a generic term for any measure that is to the bene t of investors and that is { relative to an unmodelled initial state { costly for the government budget this notion includes preferential tax treatment. Similarly, "income tax" means any labour-supply related levy on households that governments can use to raise revenues.
Under closer scrutiny, the problem of governments "in the splits" is not as paradox a s w e h a ve just put it. When generous subsidies to would-be investors are nanced out of residence based taxes on labour income, then, in a sense, workers may beseen as nancing their own jobs { by the unwarranted intermediation of governments. If both rms and workers are mobile, then governments act like middlemen: their tax policies determine the matching of labour demands and supplies. Governments "buy jobs" when rewarding rms which l o c a t e in their jurisdiction with a subsidy, and they "re-sell the jobs" when charging an income tax to workers. Of course, only employed workers are subject to the income tax and the numberof employed workers in a jurisdiction is limited by the numberof jobs created there. It is this potential rationing in the labour market which prevents that doing the splits may end too painful for governments. However, the strategic considerations involved in choosing a tax-subsidy scheme are not trivial. Assume that governments aim at maximizing their budget surplusses (tax revenues minus subsidy payouts) and that tax competition is of the extreme Bertrand, winner-take-all type: Firms locate where subsidies are most generous, giving governments the incentive to slightly overbid the highest of the other governments' subsidies. Workers choose their residence among those "industrialized" regions which impose the lightest tax burden, giving governments the incentive to slightly undercut the lowest of the other governments' tax rates.
Formally similar problems as the one just described occurin the eld of intermediation, e.g., when banks compete both for loans (by demanding low i n terest rates from borrowers) and deposits (by o ering high interest rates to lenders). Recently, this type of competition among middlemen has received some attention in the theory of ( nancial) intermediation (see, e.g., Stahl 1988 or Yanelle 1988 Yanelle , 1989 Yanelle , 1996 Yanelle , 1997 . A major question of this research 2 is whether a large number of intermediaries can replace the rather obscure gure of the Walrasian auctioneer common in competitive equilibrium theory. Although this is far from our theme, we can { with minor modi cations { transfer approaches and results from this strand of economic research to the eld of scal competition.
Tax competition is often viewed as a taming device for Leviathan governments (e.g. Sinn 1992 or, sceptically, Edwards/Keen 1996) . The mobility o f tax bases is hoped to reduce the governments' capability of exploiting them. Downward pressures on budget sizes and tax rates are perceived to be especially strong when tax competition is of the winner-take-all, Bertrand type. This re ects the fear of a "race to the bottom", often expressed in political debates on tax competition (see e.g. OECD 1998). In our framework, where tax competition is of a double Bertrand type, results are very much in an opposite direction: Equilibria are such that the maximum of the La er curve for the income tax is reached. I.e., instead of putting scal authorities on a dietary regime, tax competition here feeds governments to obesity. However, all tax revenues go to nance generous subsidies { leaving governments with zero budget surplusses in the end. Tax competition thus installs a giant, government-administered redistribution scheme from workers to capital owners.
What does this mean for the labour market? In this paper, we start from a situation with unemployment, generated by too high a xed nominal wage rate. Subsidies to rms decrease their labour cost (thus boasting labour demand), and income taxes subsidize leisure demand (reducing household incentives to supply labour). Hence, the redistribution scheme initiated by tax competition narrows the gap between labour supply and demand. As we will see, unemployment will completely disappear in an equilibrium. In so far, the middlemen-governments do a good job (necessary caveats will be added soon).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the formal framework for a double-Bertrand tax competition game. Section 3 analyses the Nash equilibrium of this game under the assumption that rms are slightly myopic. The unique Nash equilibrium may involve industrial clustering in one region, and its income tax rate is the maximizer of the income tax La er curve. Section 4 presents two variations of the model, assuming more farsighted rms. This triggers serious existence problems for equilibria. If they exist, equilibria still are located in the peak region of the La er curve for the income tax. Section 5 relates the results presented here to ndings of the literature and concludes.
The model
We consider a common market formed by a g i v en and nite numberofn > 1 (n 2 N) jurisdictions, called regions. Within the common market, there is free mobility of all goods and factors without any impediment. To focus purely on tax and subsidy competition we assume that all regions are (ex ante) identical in any r e s p e c t . Private agents (i.e., households and rms) do not have a n y initial attachment to a certain region their utility and pro t functions are not location speci c.
There is a continuum of pro t maximizing single-output rms. All rms have the same neoclassical production function f(e k), where e and k denote labour and capital input, respectively. Both inputs are essential: f(0 k ) = f(e 0) = f(0 0) = 0 for all e k > 0. f satis es the Inada limit conditions. Furthermore we assume that f e > 0 f ee < 0 f k > 0 f kk < 0 f ek > 0 and f ee f kk ; (f ek ) 2 0:
Capital and labour have positive, but decreasing marginal returns and are complementary inputs. f is concave.
Firms have exogenous capital endowments (assets) . There are no other sources for outside nance and hence a rm's capital input in production is equal to . We will identify with the size of the investment project which a rm with this endowment plans to undertake. We assume that k is continuously distributed on an interval K := ] with 0 < < < 1. By H( ) w e denote the distribution function of k. We assume that H is di erentiable and that H 0 ( ) > 0 for all 2 K.
As capital input is already xed, rms only have to decide on their location and their labour input. Locational choices depend on regional wage subsidies granted by regional governments. These wage subsidies can be interpreted as premia given to rms per created job. If rm obtains a job subsidy s 0, its pro ts amount t o = f(e ) ; (w ; s) e (1) where w > 0 i s t h e w age rate. w is exogenous and equal for all regions (see below).
Labour is endogenously supplied by households. There is a continuum of price-taking households with linear preferences on the consumption-leisure space: u(c 1 ;` ) = c + (1 ;`) where c and`2 0 1] denote consumption and labour supply, respectively. is the constant marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and will be identi ed as the household's type. It is distributed on an interval = ] where 0 < < . G( ) is the di erentiable and atomless distribution function of . Households decide on their region of residence and on their labour supply. From a household's viewpoint, regions di er in the job opportunities they o er (see below) and the income taxes they levy. If a household earns the gross wage w and is subject to a (regional) income tax t 2 0 w ), her net wage per hour of work is c = w ; t. Abusing standard taxonomy, we will often call t a tax rate. Clearly, the optimal labour choice is of the bang-bang type with
We assume that households can only work in their region of residence and, consequently, any rm can only hire workers who actually live at its location (no commuting).
Each of the identical regions i = 1 : : : n is ruled by a g o vernment which aims at maximizing its (expected) budget surplus. 3 Each regional government i uses as policy variables the regional income tax t i and the regional job subsidy s i . Governments behave non-cooperatively. A strategy of government i is a pair i = ( s i t i ). We write vectors in bold type (such a s x = ( x 1 : : : x n )). 0 and 1 denote the n-dimensional vectors of zeros and ones, respectively.
We argued at the outset that subsidizing rms is especially attractive for governments when there is unemployment. Moreover, we argued that the measure widely held appropriate by politicians for the success of their policies is the number of new jobs created. Against this background it seems odd not to give employment any explicit weight in the governments' objective functions, but rather to resort to the Leviathan hypothesis of budget surplus maximization. Recall, however, that we may interpret governments as intermediaries in the labour market. Such as ordinary salesmen seek to sell all their stocks and thus to balance purchases and sales, so do middleman-governments have a genuine interest to bring all their residents to work. An unemployed does not pay any wage taxes and thus is of no value for Leviathan governments. One might regard this as a cynical attitude towards the unemployment problem, but it demonstrates that the Leviathan assumption is not as unrelated to the employment issue as one might prima facie suspect. The timing of the game will be of crucial importance for the results. For the beginning, we adopt the following sequence of moves:
1. Regional governments move r s t b y simultaneously deciding on their strategies i = ( s i t i ).
Their choices are observed by the private agents.
2. Next, rms decide on their locations and announce the numbers of jobs they plan to create. These announcements are binding commitments.
3. Households choose their regions of residence and make labour-consumption choices.
4. All decisions become e ective: Taxes are collected, subsidies are paid out, and nal pro t and utility l e v els will be realized.
Governments are Stackelberg leaders with respect to the private agents, and play a Nash game among themselves. All private agents are small price-takers. The game structure and all moves are common knowledge. Since we consider randomized tax and subsidy schemes as unrealistic, we only discuss pure strategies.
A Fiscal Game with Myopic Firms
We do not require that supply of and demand for labour balance on the regional (or the systemwide) labour markets. Moreover, we explicitly allow for rationing, i.e., for involuntary unemployment or job vacancies. This requires some assumptions on how private agents account for possible disequilibria in the labour markets: We i n variably assume that households (who move last in all our games) take into account that they can only be employed in a region where job o ers are in su cient supply. Firms, who are second to move after governments, can in principle anticipate the residential choices and labour supply decisions of households. They could thus nd out whether all job opportunities they o er have a chance to be lled with workers. In this section, however, we analyse the game under the assumption that rms do not take into account that they may be rationed they behave as if it were certain that they can always hire as many workers as they ideally want to. To partly justify this assumption (to be dropped in Section 4) note that without government i n tervention there will be unemployment in the economy (see Assumption U below).
Hence, rms may see the case of too small a labour force simply as irrelevant.
Firms' Decisions
Firms and households make their choices in knowledge of the governments' strategies = ( s t).
Since they do not care what households do, rms are only interested in the subsidy part s of .
Firms decide on their location and on their labour demand.
It is obvious from the pro t function (1) that rms select their location among those regions which o er the highest subsidy. Given a subsidy vector s, denote byŝ := max k fs k g and by M(s) : = fi js i = sg the highest subsidy and the set of regions which o er this, respectively. We will call M(s) the set of industrialized regions because only regions in M attract businesses. Suppose rm decides to locate in region i, obtaining a job subsidy of s i . Then its labour demand e(w ; s i ) is uniquely determined by the pro t maximizing condition f e (e ) = w ; 
A rm's labour demand is the higher the larger is the job subsidy and the larger is its capital endowment. Due to the simplicity o f locational choices, total (systemwide) labour demand L d only depends on the maximal elementŝ of a subsidy vector s:
The distribution of rms across regions is irrelevant. Clearly, from (3) 
where ] denotes the cardinality o f a s e t . From a regional government's perspective, competition for business investments is of the Bertrand, winner-take-all type: Firms can only beattracted if the own subsidy is as least as high as any of the other regional subsidies.
Household Choices
When households choose their residence and labour supply, g o vernments have already decided on and rms have already found their locations and announced their job openings. Given , e v ery household knows that he can only get a job in an industrialized region. Among these regions, households prefer low-tax ones. If all households (or a representative sample of them) faced the same tax rate t 2 0 w ], total labour supply (possibly adjusted by the sample size)
Check that the function L s (t) cuts both axes in a tax rate/labour supply diagram:
We assume that if several regions in M(s) o er the same lowest income tax rate, households arbitrarily choose one of these regions to apply for a job there. It may w ell happen that labour demand is not su cient to cover labour supply at the smallest tax rate. Then the rejected households turn to the industrialized region with the second (third, fourth, ...) lowest tax rate where they apply with a labour supply correspondingly adjusted according to (6). We assume that households always move in representative samples, i.e., each government faces the same distribution G( ) of households. We can now calculate the numberL i s ( ) of workers applying for a job in region i, g i v en governments' strategies :
If i = 2 M(s), then labour supply is zero in this region, regardless of its tax rate.
If region i is industrialized and sets a tax rate t i , the number of households applying for a job in i is given by
Equation (7) (5)). Assume for a moment that all industrialized regions chose di erent tax rates and that region i is the unique lowest-tax region among them: t i < t k for all k 2 M(s) a n d k 6 = i. By (6) 
, then the rejected households will move to that industrialized region, say j, which has the next higher tax rate (i.e., where t i < t j < t k for all k 6 = i j). At a tax rate t j total labour supply would be G(w;t j ). An amount o f L d (ŝ)=]M(s) workers has already been employed in region i, such that region j only faces an actual labour supply of G(w ; t j ) ; L d (ŝ)=]M(s) if this is greater than zero and of zero else. If there are still workers who are involuntarily unemployed, these households move to the region with the next lowest tax rate where labour supply is determined in an analogous manner. For the case that several regions set the same tax rate we assume that there will bean equal split of labour supply amongst these regions. This is expressed by the fraction in front of the square brackets in equation (7).
In a natural way, employment E i ( ) in region i is de ned as the minimum of regional labour supply (7) and labour demand (5):
To h a ve a n i n teresting problem we make the following
Assumption U says that without government intervention (i.e., with = (0 0)), total labour supply exceeds total labour demand: There is systemwide unemployment. Since with identical strategies in all regions rms and households distribute equally across the economy, we have unemployment i n e v ery region when all governments are passive:
for all i. Assumption U can equivalently be written as:
R K e(w ) d H( ) < G (w), stating that the exogenous and constant (gross) wage rate w is too high to clear the labour market. A s t o r y fabricated to motivate Assumption U may g o a s f o l l o ws: The systemwide wage rate w has been xed outside the model by trade unions and employer lobbys in wage negotiations. 4 These agents have agreed upon a wage rate above the market clearing level (which is not too unrealistic). As a consequence, there is unemployment in a "laissez-faire" regime. Regional governments observe this and try to promote employment conditions in their jurisdictions by attracting businesses. 
The number introduced in Lemma 1 has the following property: If rms are subsidized at rate perjob and simultaneously workers are taxed at the same rate , then total labour supply and total labour demand will balance. Hence, w ; is the competitive (Walrasian) price of labour.
Governments' Payo s
Governments are assumed to maximize their budget surplusses, i.e. the di erences between tax revenues and subsidies. Given a strategy vector , the budget surplus B i of government i amounts to
where E i and L i d are given by (8) and (7). N o t e i n ( 1 0 ) t h a t g o vernments pay subsidies for every workplace created in their jurisdictions (i.e., for L i d ), not only for those actually employed (E i ).
Since with identical policies of all regions rms and households distribute equally across regions, all budgets balance if all governments choose t i = s i = :
3.5 The Nash Equilibrium
Our double Bertrand tax competition game has been crafted such as to exhibit the same structure as a competition between pro t maximizing intermediaries on goods or nancial markets. Recently, Yanelle (1996) examined the features of double Bertrand competition between intermediaries. Her main result (Proposition 2.2) applies immediately to our scenario:
Result 1 The tax competition game has a symmetric and (up to a permutation of regions) unique Nash equilibrium = ( s 1 t 1). In this equilibrium all governments choose a tax rate t = a r g m a x t t L s (t):
Furthermore, all governments choose the subsidy s such that
If t 6 = , then in an equilibrium all rms locate in the same region.
Proof: We essentially follow Yanelle (1996, pp. 15f ).
is an equilibrium:
Suppose, all governments j 6 = i have chosen t j = t and s j = s . Government i's considerations concerning a best reply are the following: With s i < s no rm would settle in region i. With s i > s government i would attract all rms, but its subsidy payments would be greater than the maximum amount of income taxes it could ever raise:
if s i > s (since L d (ŝ) strictly increases inŝ). Hence, B i < 0. Therefore, s i = s is the bestchoice. Given s , however, it is optimal to set t i = t , for government i would face B i < 0 with any other tax rate.
2. is the unique equilibrium:
Suppose there were another equilibrium~ = ( s 1 t 1) 6 = (due to the symmetry of the model, only symmetric equilibria have to be considered).
(i) Ifs > s , then governments' expenditures would exceed the maximum earnings possible: B i < 0 f o r a l l i. Corollary: In the Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game:
1. all regional budgets balance 2. t = if and only if is the revenue maximizing rate of the income tax 3. if t 6 = , total and regional labour demands exceeds total and, resp., labour supplies: For a better understanding, it may be helpful to write Result 1 in a di erent form. Let t := arg max t 0 (t L s (t)) bethe unconstraint maximizer of the La er curve for the income tax. Note thatt may di er from t as de ned in (11). There are two possible equilibrium con gurations:
Ift , t h e n t i = s i = for all i.
Ift > , t h e n t i =t and s i = s for all i, whereŝ solvest L s (t) = s L d (s).
These two con gurations are depicted in Figure 1 and 2, respectively, where we chose labour demand and supply functions to be linear for simplicity. 5
Figures 1 and 2 go here All regional governments choose their income tax rate t such as to maximize attainable tax revenues from labour. This maximum need not coincide with the unconstraint m a x i m um of the income tax La er curve, which is reached at the tax ratet. Using the de nition of , we can rewrite (11) to obtain t = arg max x fx minfL s (x) L d (x)gg (13) which exhibits that governments tax employable (as contrasted to supplied) labour to the highest degree possible.
The original version of Result 1 in Yanelle (1996) is used to demonstrate that the gure of the Walrasian auctioneer who operates the market processing in competitive equilibrium theory cannot always be replaced by i n termediaries who engage in a Bertrand-game (also see Yanelle 1997 ). This interpretation carries over to the application of Yanelle's result here (see below). Moreover, Result 1 o ers a bunch o f n e w i n terpretations in the scal competition context:
Result 1 says that in the Nash equilibrium of a scal game between middleman-governments the feasible budget size is maximized: Leviathans grow fat to their maximum height. It seems to be a stylized fact that the size of real-world governments (measured, e.g., by government spending as a percentage of GDP) is ever growing. Once celebrated in Wagner's Law as evidence for social progress, this upward trend has since long become a matter of serious concern in most industrialized countries. Globalization, deeper economic integration, and tax competition are commonly thought to bepowerful devices to tame scal hunger. However, this intuition has so far hardly any support from reality: Although in the 1980s and 1990s the breeze of globalization has become a strong wind, government sizes are still going up. Our model may o er an explanation for this conundrum. With free factor ows, governments may be pushed into the role of intermediary salesmen. Result 1 then says that scal competition makes governments grow as fat as possible.
According to (12), equilibrium job subsidies are adapted such as to balance governments' budgets. While the budget size is maximal, all revenues are spent, leaving governments with nothing to use for their own purposes. The tax competition equilibrium thus involves the most massive transfers from workers to rms. Workers are "exploited" to the greatest possible extent, and, as all of this money goes to rms, subsidies reach their highest a ordable level, too. "Exploitation" should not be taken literally, s i n c e , b y assumption U, net incomes w of the initial situation are too high relative to the competitive w age level.
Tax competition corrects for this deterioration from the equilibrium. We have already pointed out that a major cause for high unemployment in the real world is too high labour cost. In a sense, tax competition brings about a government-nanced cut in labour cost which in an equilibrium amount to w ; s . 6 In order to enable governments to nance the cuts, income taxes have to beincreased from zero to t . This is reminding of a tax incidence hypothesis for the labour market model, suggested e.g. by Tyrv ainen (1995) , that the non-wage cost of labour (the tax wedge) is half borne by w age-earners (reducing labour supply) and half by rms (lowering labour demand).
Recall that can beinterpreted as the competitive level of taxes or subsidies (since the labour market clears at a net wage of w; ). According to item 5 in the Corollary, tax rates and subsidies are never lower than . Often they are higher (namely, i f hence lies in the increasing part of the La er curve for the income tax). I.e., compared to the competitive level, workers are taxed too heavily whereas rms are subsidized too generously. This sounds identical to an important observation of the "standard" tax competition literature (e.g., Bucovetsky/Wilson 1990) . However, the analogy is misleading. In the standard models capital is mobile and labour immobile. Furthermore, the benchmarks are di erent: Here it is a labour market equilibrium, there it is the bene t principle of taxation.
The industrialized region(s) may face overcapacities in the equilibrium: If is in the increasing part of the income tax La er curve, then there will be job vacancies in the equilibrium (L d > L s ). Otherwise, full employment will emerge. Hence, middlemengovernments often "buy" too many jobs. Starting from a situation with unemployment (cf. Assumption 1), scal competition among Leviathans may l e a d t o a n o versupply of job opportunities. This result is certainly oddseen against reality which has unemployment galore. In our model, it is due to the myopic behaviour of rms which, spurred by v ast subsidies, "create" jobs without checking whether these can be employed. One might also blame governments for being reponsible for the oddity of overcapacities. They subsidize workplaces, not job matches. Put di erently, employed workers do not only (partially) nance their own jobs, but also some vacancies. We will address to this issue in Section 4.
In the Nash equilibrium, there may bean extreme industrial concentration: Firms and consequently workers all settle in one region. Surprisingly, this result emerges without imposing any spatial structure on the model. Especially, there are no agglomeration advantages or disadvantages which m a y explain the result. The locational structure is pure chance: the region where the industry clusters is chosen randomly (with equal probability for all regions). In its spirit (but not in its origins), the clustering result here is reminiscent of a similar result in Arthur (1990) who explains locational patterns in economies as the eventual outcomes emerging from some historical processes. In his Theorem 1, Arthur (1990) shows that an extreme spatial concentration may occurinaneconomy under free mobility of rms with identical behavioural patterns, but without any a d v antages or disadvantages of agglomeration. Clustering simply re ects homogeneity of the rms' needs for workers. The similarity i n t h e t wo models lies in the observation that (dis-)economies of agglomeration or a speci c spatial structure in an economy are not essential in order to explain dense industrial concentrations.
made. Firms thus behave a s i f t h e y w ere to pay w ages for and produce with workers they in fact do not (and cannot) hire. In this section we drop this assumption and turn to a more rational rm behaviour. We modify stages 2 and 4 of the game as follows: 4'. All decisions become e ective: Actual employment decisions are made, taxes are collected, subsidies are paid out, and nal pro t and utility l e v els will be realized.
Firms can only announce jobs in the region where they settle. Announcement are binding commitments in so far as rms must not install fewer workplaces than announced except for the case that labour supply in the region is too small to nd enough sta . As before, subsidies are paid per announced job, whether vacant or not (Governments still are na ve).
We n o w m ust distinguish between the announced and the actual value of a variable. Announced variables will wear a tilde. Letẽ Next check that households are not a ected by t h e change in the rules of the game. They can still only apply for a job in a potentially industrialized region. Rationing of the rms is irrelevant for them. Households can treat announced jobs as if they were actually created. Hence, neither their migration nor their labour supply decisions di er from those in Section 3. Eqs. (6) and (7) remain : (14) 15
As by assumption rms never hire more workers than they announce, actual employment E i coincides with e ective labour demand L i d , which never exceeds the smaller of announced job capacities and labour supply:
Regional governments collect taxes per unit of labour employed and spend subsidies per job announcement. The budget surplus of government i is given by:
We assume that, if rationing ocurs in region i, then it hits all rms in that region in equal proportions. Hence, if it announces to create a numberofẽ( ) jobs in i, then a rm will actually employ a n umberof
workers. Hence, rm 's pro ts when it locates in region i amount t o :
= f(e ) ; w e + s i ẽ = f(e ) ;
)# e where we u s e d ( 1 7 ) . Unlike in the previous scenario, rms do not necessarily locate in the region with the highest subsidy. Rather than being rationed a rm may prefer a less generous region without rationing. Firms also have to take into account the tax rates t, not only the subsidy part of . The relevant parameter is the e ective subsidy ratẽ
which is higher than the statutory one if rationing occurs in region i. (Recall that subsidies are paid perjob opening, not perhiring contract.) The set of potentially industrialized regions is then:M ( ) = fi js i s k for all kg :
Next we need an assumption about how rms infer the e ective subsidiess i from the observed governmental strategies . In doing so they must anticipate households' decisions and the other rms' behaviour. To keep matters simple, we assume that all rms ignore their in uence on alls i (which in fact is marginal) and that their forecasting methods are identical. Given , a l l rms thus unanimously foresee the same vector ofs i . Somehow v aguely, these calculations shall be based on the assumption that all agents behave rationally in the pursuit of their objectives. Especially { and this is indeed the only conjectural assumption we need {, if the strategy vector chosen by the governments does not necessitate any rationing, then rms should not expect rationing to happen. In that case, they will behave as outlined in Section 3. We are again interested in the Nash equilibria of the subsidy-and-tax competition game among regional governments. The problem now is a bit uglier. As a rst step, we s h o w Lemma 2 In a Nash equilibrium , l a b our supply in all potentially industrialized r egions does not exceed announced job capacities, i.e.:
The proof of Lemma 2 is relegated to the Appendix. Lemma 2 has a series of important consequences:
1. In a Nash equilibrium , a l l industrialized regions levy the same tax rate: t i = t for all i 2M( ): Proof: From Lemma 2, there is never oversupply of labour in any industrialized region and thus economywide. If a region levies a tax rate higher than the minimum tax rate of all other regions, than it will not attract any labour and thus will run a budget de cit. Hence, from (14), we get that in an equilibrium
As there is no rationing, in a Nash equilibrium announced and e ective labour demand will coincide for every rm:
In a Nash equilibrium,s i = s i . Consequently, all potentially industrialized regions must o er the same subsidy:
The Nash equilibrium budget surplus of every region i 2M amounts to B i = ( t ; s ) G(w ; t ):
4. As a consequence, in a Nash equilibrium there is no rationing in any region:
Recall the assumption that, if the strategy vector does not necessitate any rationing, then rms will behave such as in Section 3. We s o f a r h a ve shown that in a Nash equilibrium rationing cannot occur, but that the labour market will clear. Hence, the only candidate vector for a Nash equilibrium is the "Walrasian" v ector = (1 1). From Result 1 we k n o w, however, that
(1 1) can only be a Nash equilibrium if is at the same time a revenue maximizing tax rate.
This observation carries over to the present scenario:
Result 2 Let L d (s) and L s (t) be as originally de ned in (4) and (6) and be such that L s ( ) =
then the tax competition game possesses a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium which is given by = (1 1):
Otherwise, no Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof: Under condition (20) the Nash equilibrium derived in Result 1 does not imply rationing, but has clearing labour markets. Hence, it is also an equilibrium of the modi ed game. If condition (20) does not hold, the Nash equilibrium of Result 1 involves rationing. Now suppose that (1 1) is a Nash equilibrium. Then there existst 6 = such that
Let government j choose s j = + < t = t j . Since with this strategy rms do not expect to be rationed in region j, the budget surplus of government j amounts to:
which is a pro table deviation from the zero-surplus situation ( ). Q.E.D.
Condition (20) requires the labour market clearing tax rate to be a revenue maximizing one. If condition (20) holds, then a unique Nash equilibrium exists which is symmetric, entails clearing regional and systemwide labour markets and puts governments on top of the La er curve for the "employment tax". This equilibrium does not di er from the one depicted in Figure 1 above (compare (20) and (13), which describes the Nash equilibrium tax rate in the setting of Section 3). If condition (20) does not hold, then no Nash equilibrium exists. Yanelle (1996) analyses Bertrand competition among intermediaries who, in addition to the usual buying and selling prices can also choose capacities they maximally will buy from sellers. A Nash equilibrium then only exists if the competitive price in the market is also a revenue maximizing one. In this case, buying and selling at the Walrasian price and creating capacities equal to the trade volume at this price is the equilibrium strategy (Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 in Yanelle 1996) . Result 2 above is in the same spirit: By xing tax rates and subsidy levels, regional governments induce rms to make job announcements that can beinterpreted as capacities. In a Nash equilibrium the piling up of over-capacities cannot occur, i.e., no region would let rms announce a greater numberof subsidized jobs than can later beoccupied (cf. (19) ). However, such an equilibrium may fail to exist.
For interpretations and implications of Result 2 we refer to our discussion of Result 1. Note, however, that a Nash equilibrium in the actual scenario cannot lead to industrial clustering in one region. For the cases where Result 1 predicts such an extreme pattern, Result 2 states the non-existence of an equilibrium. Hence, if a Nash equilibrium exists in the actual scenario, rms and workers distribute equally across the regional system.
Governments Move Twice
We brie y consider a second modi cation of the original game. In the previous section we made a distinction between announced and actual numbers of workplaces, thus rendering rms' reasoning "more rational". Here, we adopt a di erent sequence of moves: First, regional governments non-cooperatively x their subsidies s. Second, rms make their locational choices and thus reveal how m uch jobs they want t o o p e n . Third, governments non-cooperatively set income tax rates t. Finally, households decide on their residences and employers. When it comes to choosing tax rates, regional goverments already know their budgetary needs: In the rst stage they have committed to a "buying price" for jobs created in their jurisdiction, and in the second one rms have imposed the corresponding quantitites. Obviously, we have a two-stage game among governments. We therefore look for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
Formally, the setting just described is identical to that in Stahl (1988) . Two main results of Stahl's approach on winner-take-all competition among merchants can thus readily be transferred to the interregional framework presented here: 8
Result 3 (Stahl (1988) ) Let L d (s) and L s (t) be as originally de ned in (4) and (6) and be
then the tax competition game possesses a unique and symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium which is given by = (1 1):
Otherwise, no subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium exists.
The proof is a straightforward adaptation of the proofs for Propositions 1 and 2 in Stahl (1988) .
The reader may feel to encounter a d ej a-vue when coming across Result 3: Apart from the tiny "subgame-perfect" added, Result 3 coincides with Result 2. Consequently, in case it exists an equilibrium is such as in Figure 1 , part a) and has the properties and implications already discussed in Section 3.
The alternative scenarios discussed in this section reveal that severe existence problems for Nash equilibria can beexpected in Bertrand tax competition. This is in line with results obtained by Schulze/Koch (1994) and Koch/Schulze (1998) for one-sided Bertrand tax competition.
There, existence problems are due to asymmetries or to the availability of "outside options" for taxation. In the double-Bertrand setting discussed here, neither of these assumptions is needed to trigger non-existence.
If an equilibrium exists in either of the two scenarios discussed in this section, then it involves full employment. This is reminiscent of a result obtained by Gabszewicz/van Ypersele (1996) for a scal game where the strategic variable of governments is the minimum wage. In this model, if there is too high a wage rate in a region, mobile capital will ee the region and thereby trigger unemployment. Therefore the minimum wage rate will (often) beseton the (low) competitive level, although the policy makers' preferences are strongly biased towards workers' interests. In the model presented here, where regional governments in fact also determine the wage rate, the competitive level will emerge, too. Although the mechanisms here and in Gabszewicz/van Ypersele (1996) are quite diverse, they share a common message: Fiscal competition drives labour markets towards the equilibrium, which, for employed workers, comes at the price of a lower wage rate.
Discussion and Conclusion
We set up a model of a tax competition game where governments choose their tax-and-subsidy strategies as to corner both sides of a distorted labour market. It seems worthwile to compare the ndings reported here to those emerging from the more standard tax competition literature which usually assumes that there exists at least one immobile item in the economy. As Koch/Schulze (1998) point out, the core model of tax competition uses (among other ingredients) capital as a generically mobile factor, whereas all other factors cannot cross regional borders. Even in richer models with several mobile items (such as Burbidge/Myers 1994) there is one immobile tax issue (plausibly enough, land is often chosen for this role). Only few authors examine the case of both capital and labour mobility, albeit with imperfect household mobility (see, e.g., Mansoorian/Myers 1993 , or Eggert 1995 . In all these models, regional governments optimize an objective function related to the utility of the owners of the immobile factors. The main message says that the Nash equilibria of such games are ine cient: Free mobility of capital imposes an arbitrage condition upon the economy and thus gives o -spring to interregional externalities that are ignored by self-concerned regional governments. The approach t a k en here di ers from the standard model in several respects: Goverments in our model aim at maximizing their budget surplusses rather than regional welfare. This Leviathan assumption is not uncommon in the literature, but most of these models (e.g., Kanbur/Keen 1993 , Schulze/Koch 1994 , Koch/Schulze 1998 or Janeba/Peters 1999) incorporate only one (namely the revenue) side of the government budget and thus implicitly assume that expenditures are xed. Moreover, governments in these models can resort to an (elastic or inelastic) "inside option" for taxation and thus do not entirely depend on mobile tax bases to cover their (unmodeled) scal needs. Sinn (1992) discusses the taming e ects of tax competition on Leviathans in a constitutional framework (however, the model is not fully speci ed). In Edwards/Keen (1996) government objectives encompass pure Leviathan behaviour as a special case. Revenues from taxes on mobile capital can be used to nance either local public goods, which bene t local citizens, or socially wasteful activities, which bene t only the policy maker. Ed-wards/Keen (1996) nd that a policy coordination among regional governments may b e harmful to the utility of a representative citizen which happens if and only if the elasticity of the tax base falls below Leviathan's marginal propensity to engage in wasteful activities. This indicates that for tax competition coming close to the Bertrand-type policy coordination is always bene cial, as (in an equilibrium) the tax base reacts in nitly elastic with respect to marginal tax changes.
Unlike in great parts of the scal federalism literature, there are no immobile items in our model (except for the ever-lasting goverments). Let us brie y consider what would happen if either households or rms were immobile:
1. If each region is inhabited by a su ciently large number of households, luring an investor into the region will create a marginal budget surplus of t ; s i perjob. For simplicity, l e t t be a uniform tax rate in all regions. Firms still locate where regional subsidies s i are highest. Consequently, a race between governments towards higher subsidies will start. In the end subsidies are as high as to eat up the whole marginal surplus: s i = t for all regions.
2. Now assume that rms are irreversibly established and have installed workbenches in su cient supply (assume an equal distribution across regions). If mobile households can beattracted to work at these workbenches by low tax rates, then governments engage in a tax cutting race and the zero tax rate is the unique Nash equilibrium of such a game. If no budget de cit is allowed, this requires zero job subsidies as well.
In any case governments end up with a zero budget surplus { such as in the present paper. All these balanced budgets are, however, reached by quite di erent tax-subsidy mixes. The interesting element in our observations is that governments choose tax rates as to climb o n top of the La er curve, and spend all funds to footloose rms. A simple intuition runs as follows: Attracting su ciently many rms by high subsidies is prerequisite for governments to earn su ciently high revenues from the income tax. As a consequence, the demand side of the labour market can fully exploit the supply side. Of course, this is an implication of the order of moves in our game: rms move before households. An interesting suggestion for further research would be to reverse the order of moves. Intuition tells us that if households settle before rms choose their locations, this will lead to either a Walrasian outcome or to a zero tax-and-subsidy equilibrium { thus perpetuating unemployment. One might certainly question the assumption of perfect mobility of both rms and workers on the grounds of reality. Somehow surprisingly, empirical evidence for tax-induced migration responses seems to be more clearcut for labour than for capital. Meanwhile, however, improved statistical analysis nds that both factors do in fact migrate to tax-favoured locations (see Inman/Rubinfeld 1996 or Hines 1996 for details and further references). Hence, the mobility assumption adopted here is certainly extreme, but not totally farfetched.
All regions in our model are identical. Hence, it does not come as a surprise when all equilibria are symmetric. Similarly, if regions di ered in size, preferences, or resource endowments, equilibria of a tax competition games would re ect these di erences (see e.g. Haufler/Wooton 1999 or Huizinga/Nielsen 1997 . However, recent empirical ndings seem to support a convergence hypothesis for tax rates in the EU { albeit on a high overall level of taxation (see e.g. Chennells/Griffith 1997) . Tanzi/Zee (1998) report that in 1997 the tax rates on individual incomes (which correspond to the t i of our model) in the EU averaged at rather high 47.5%, but exhibited a rather small coe cient of variation of 18.7%, which is only a third of that among the 50 states of the U.S. They interpret their observation as some sort of "decentralized harmonization", working through economic integration and factor mobility in the EU. In principle, the present model, which predicts high and equal income tax rates in a tax competition game may theoretically underpin such an interpretation. However, since data on the non-wage cost of labour { which w ould correspond to (the negative of) the s i in our model { are not available, and furthermore our model lacks a lot of reality's features, we refrain from drawing too many parallels to European reality.
Finally recall the main idea of this paper: Governments in an integrated economic framework operate as middlemen. They use their contestable tax monopoly for correcting for possible distortions which hinder markets from fully revealing their allocative prowess. Who thinks this an overly optimistic view, will see sel sh, merchant governments as "selling the state away" in bidding wars and tax competition. Anyway, h uge, Leviathan-like g o vernments are not necessarily doomed to extinction in the ongoing process of globalization and integration governments of that type may e v en grow t o o b e s i t y.
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 2 Suppose the contrary of the assertion. I.e., there exists j with strategy (s j t j ) such t h a t L j d ( ) > 0 and L j s ( ) >L j d ( ) = E j ( ). First verify that then in all regions k 2M( ) with t k t j we m ust have L k s ( ) >L k d ( )
too. Now consider a marginal increase of region j's tax rate from t j to t j + and analyse what happens to L j s as given by (14) . Two cases have to be distinguished: T h e r e i s n o k 6 = j such t h a t t k = t j . Then: L j s ( ) = G(w ; t j ) ; By a marginal increase in t j the sum term in this expression does not change (especially check that no rm will change its behaviour). Only will the value of G change, but, due to continuity, marginally. I.e., > 0 c a n b e c hosen such t h a t L j s still exceedsL j d .
There exists k 2M( ) other than j such that t k = t j . Let q be the numberof such The rst of these inequalities follows from (22), the second holds for small enough due to the continuity o f G, and the third one holds by assumption. Hence, by an appropriate increase in t j , g o vernment j would not a ect its tax base. Employment in region j is still E j =L j s . However, as the tax rate is higher, so are revenues. Hence, cannot be an equilibrium.
Q.E.D. 
